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Abstract
Contemporary political communication is conditioned by an information environment characterised, on the one hand, by
increased choice, and on the other by the fragmentation and multiplication of the ways of consuming information. This ar-
ticle introduces the notion of the ‘interrelated public agenda’ as a frame to study this context, taking into account elements
of convergence and divergence from a single viewpoint, adopting a complex analysis model which proceeds along axes
which make it possible to detect a continuum in which opposing forces are in a constant, problematic equilibrium. In this
sense, we identified three dimensions which are helpful in describing public agenda interrelations. First, horizontality vs
verticality, which contains the dynamics of power, and is generated in a context of political disintermediation, through the
altered nature of themedia system—in the complex relation between legacymedia and web 2.0, and between social, insti-
tutional actors, and others. Second, personal vs aggregative, which stresses the need to take account of convergences and
divergences between personal orientation towards certain issues and the aggregative pressure in different media spaces
in which people feel at home: from information consumption via media diets of varying complexity to active participation
in the production of content or in public discourse, offline and online. And finally, dynamic vs static, which points to the
need to orient analysis towards the relation between media spaces rather than focusing on specific spaces, thus helping,
importantly, to make up for the current dearth of research in comparison with studies of single platforms.
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1. Introduction
That a well-functioning democracy needs citizens who
are at least minimally well-informed about matters of
public importance is a widely held assumption (Dahl,
1998); how that information is be obtained, though, is
a question inevitably affected by the media system in
which we are placed and by the power relations existing
between the various actors. It is clear that in the name of
pluralism and difference, the aim of channeling citizens
into a single sphere, in particular, significantly changes
how they learn about political and current affair news
(Shehata & Strömbäck, 2018). It is equally clear that the
acquisition of information depends, first and foremost,
on the interest shown by the citizens themselves, who
are less and less synonymous with the “informed citi-
zen” and more and more with the “monitorial citizen”
(Schudson, 1999). Whichever citizen is chosen for refer-
ence, the effective availability of information proves in-
dispensable to the orderly working of democratic insti-
tutions. However, in contemporary societies, the most
widely shared concern, except in some rare cases, is not
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the shortage of information, but the very opposite—the
abundance of information. Hence, if in the past the is-
sue at stake was the real availability and accessibility of
information for all citizens, as well as the opportunity to
allow space for different and contrasting interests, the
focus today is on the consequences of a communicative
and informative surfeit which certainly makes for diversi-
fication, but also for fragmentation.
The clearest evidence of this interest is to be found
in the emphasis placed on the spread and centrality of
echo chambers, described as the perverse effect of the
multiplication of voices on the net and of the hemophil-
iac tendencies of the individual. The truth of the matter
is that the phenomenon has been considerably overes-
timated so much so as to overshadow other questions,
like the survival/transformation of the public agenda in a
high-choicemedia environment. The adoption of a cross-
media research approach after years of exclusive concen-
tration on social media has again raised the question of
a convergent public agenda. This article aims to exam-
ine afresh the concept of public agenda and to argue
that it is still possible to talk about it, albeit in different
terms than in the past. More precisely, we think that it
is possible to talk about an ‘interrelated public agenda,’
which can be defined and traced thanks to the use of
specific dimensions. Structured in five parts, the article
begins by analysing the fragmentation of the media en-
vironment in which we are placed today; Section 3 deals
with the central role of the public agenda in the study
of contemporary political communication; Section 4with
the variables of the ‘interrelated public agenda,’ i.e., an
agenda that is possible to trace in the contemporary con-
text; Section 5 with the dimensions of the ‘interrelated
public agenda’ seen in relation to the challenges to our
conceptualisation of the public sphere in a multiplicity
of public spheres; and Section 6 ends the article with a
discussion of our proposal and some general conclusions
about the survival/transformation of the public agenda
and public sphere.
2. The Fragmentation of Media Environment
The tradition of studies of agenda-setting has showed
how the salience of issues on the media’s agenda in-
fluences the salience of the same issues on the public
agenda: In this sense we can say that themedia’s agenda
set the public’s agenda. These studies point out how, at a
first level, themedia influence the perception of the hier-
archy of topics; at a second level, how they structure the
public’s knowledge of these topics (their salience); and,
at a third level, that research on agenda-setting effects
point out howmedia can influence an integrated picture
of these attributes (McCombs&Guo, 2014). In this sense,
newsmedia play a central role in building a public agenda
and in citizen participation in the public sphere.
Although over the years the dominant attention of
agenda-setting studies has focused on a particular as-
pect of its theory—the transfer of issue salience from
the newsmedia to the public agenda—in the last decade
other research “has expanded to include many other
channels of communication–political advertising, conver-
sations, and social media” (McCombs, Shaw, & Weaver,
2014), observing the new media ecosystem, the impact
of the networkedmedia agenda on the networked public
agenda, and how this affects the public sphere.
The abundance of communication, typical of the cur-
rent media ecosystem, stems from the transformations
introduced by the Internet and social media, as regards
the production, distribution, and consumption of infor-
mation, and the interconnections between mass media
logic and networked media logic (Klinger & Svensson,
2015). Various scholars have indicated just how com-
plex and problematic the impact of digital media on a
shared public space is. Dahlgren (2005), for example,
while welcoming the opportunity to extend and plural-
ize the public sphere, draws attention to the risk of dis-
persion and of a cacophony of voices, leading to the
inevitable fragmentation of the public agenda and au-
dience. In an essay which has become a classic of me-
dia studies, Bennett and Iyengar (2008) have underlined
how audience fragmentation, combined with channel
proliferation, reduced the opportunities for casual con-
tact with content that is not deliberately selected, and
increased the opportunities for consuming content in
line with pre-existing attitudes. In short, they recognized
the typical ingredients of the fragmentation/polarization
phenomenon which, some years later, would be the fo-
cus of studies on the fourth age of political communica-
tion (Blumler, 2016). This age can be described in terms
of the coexistence of: a) a high choice media environ-
ment; and b) the fragmentation andmultiplication of the
means of consuming information. In developing simulta-
neously, these traits create an effect of centrifugal diver-
sification, producing “a vibrant communicative sphere”
(Blumler, 2016, p. 4) more “sensitive” to voices gaining
expression, thanks, not least, to the success of the so-
cial media. Despite the fragmentation which inevitably
ensues, it is still possible, according to Blumler (2018,
p. 89), to talk about a “networked public sphere, albeit a
rather chaotic one.” Thus, while the contemporary pub-
lic sphere can be considered chaotic, it certainly cannot
be assumed that it no longer exists.
The challenge of studyingwhat constitutes the chaos,
divergence, dissonance, and disruption of the public
sphere has been taken up and reissued by other scholars
interested in tracing the transformations of political com-
munication in a high-choicemedia environment. Bennett
and Pfetsch (2018, p. 249) explicitly urge us to focus at-
tention on the fact that “there are many media agendas
running throughmainstreamandnichemedia and across
digital platforms and blogs, which seldom converge in
the authoritative power to set the ‘public agenda.”’ This
is in line with the recommendation to “analyse online
and offline dissonant public spheres and ask how they
relate to each other and which functions they fulfill in
political communication” (Pfetsch, 2018, p. 63).
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Hence, the dissonant elements singled out by many
scholars in relation to the public sphere do not necessar-
ily lead to the disappearance of a public agenda or to it
simply being replaced by an idea of multiplied agendas,
fragmented and unconnected from one another. Rather,
the transformations of the public sphere by dissonant
and more “sensitive” means than a multiplicity of non-
institutionalized actors points to the need to contextual-
ize the idea of public agenda in an “information environ-
ment shaped by the behavior of political actors as well as
media actors and ordinary citizens, with reciprocal influ-
ences on all sets of actors” (van Aelst et al., 2017, p. 6).
It is necessary to bear in mind the characteristics of
this media environment and the reciprocal influences
among the various actors involved in the production of
the public agenda; it is equally important, however, to
recognise that “there are reasons to be concerned about
increasing fragmentation and polarization, but that this
concern needs to be tempered by empirical findings
which show that neither the supply nor the demand
for biased information is as widespread as is sometimes
claimed” (van Aelst et al., 2017, p. 14). The appeal for
caution voiced by van Aelst et al. (2017) as to the true
extent of the fragmentation and polarization phenom-
enamarks a turning point after a lengthy period in which
a sometimes exaggerated emphasis was placed on the
spread of forms of communicative self-segregation ha-
bitually practised by individuals when consuming politi-
cal information.
In other words, the real or potential dissonance
of the public agenda caused by the abundance of
communication—understood as the product of numer-
ous channels, numerous devices, numerous messages,
and numerous actors—has often been operationalized
as an inevitable proliferation of multiple agendas, unre-
lated to one another and to the more general context in
which they are placed. Thus, instead of considering the
public agenda as ‘interrelated,’ it has been ascribed and
confined to the specific communicative environments in
which it is created, in a state of isolation and separateness.
3. The Public Agenda between Legacy and Social Media
As many scholars have pointed out, despite undoubted
signs of dissonance and disconnection, the public agenda
is still central to the study of contemporary political com-
munication. From the earliest studies carried out at a
time when blogs had assumed a central role in the pub-
lic political debate, it was immediately clear that the con-
tents produced by bloggers and those produced by the
legacy media were thematically convergent: “The media
agenda is fairly stable across news outlets despite grow-
ing diversification of information channels” (Kook Lee,
2007, p. 754). This interrelation is further confirmed by
Maier’s (2010) comparative study of websites news, tra-
ditional newspapers, television, and radio.
Communication abundance, with attendant centrifu-
gal diversification, does not appear to be reflected to
any significant extent in the information provided by the
individual media outlets. Even in the presence of en-
vironmental pressures designed to guarantee recogniz-
ability within what has been called the marketplace of
attention (Webster, 2014), the agenda continues, to a
large extent, to be shared, confirming that “the norms
that govern the media overall are often more impor-
tant than what distinguishes one form of media from an-
other” (Strömbäck & Dimitrova, 2011, p. 33). The exis-
tence of shared norms and procedures in the field of jour-
nalism tends to promote the convergence of agendas, es-
pecially for public events and breaking news (Djerf-Pierre
& Shehata, 2017).
The introduction of references to the platform char-
acteristics which determine the outlet’s publication cycle
does not jeopardize the existence of a common agenda,
but confirms and reinforces structuring in terms of “ver-
tical media” (TV news and mainstream newspapers) and
“horizontal media” (cable news and websites; Shaw &
Weaver, 2014). The same is not true of the introduction
of references to the enlargement of the sphere of ac-
tion of those who can contribute to building the agenda.
In the past, one could talk of the interaction of politi-
cians and journalists as a dance, but today it is more
complex and produces wholly new dynamics. This is es-
pecially true of the social media, a stage on which po-
litical actors, activists, backers, and ordinary citizens can
champion causes and take stances with a view to gaining
greater visibility for certain issues andmustering support.
To sense the importance of this, one need only cite the
transformation of the information cycles in the interac-
tion between legacy media and social media, detailed so
effectively by Chadwick (2013).
It is no accident that this is the research area most
favoured by scholars who are as interested in analysing
the public agenda as the intermedia agenda, under-
stood as transference of issues salience across media
(McCombs et al., 2014). The intermedia agenda ap-
proach examines the ability to dictate the issues for
the media agenda in its entirety and/or for the individ-
ual media outlets (Conway, Kenski, & Wang, 2015). The
centrality of the social media, and Twitter in particu-
lar, has kindled a keen interest in its agenda-building
role, spanning an interlinked continuum which ranges
from the top-down dominance of the news media to
bottom-up messaging in which the platform influences
the agenda power of legacy media, while maintaining
a reciprocal relationship (Conway, Filer, Kenski, & Tsetsi,
2017). Beyond the ability of one or another media out-
let to set the agenda, the research focus is the con-
vergence/divergence between the agenda of a platform
like Twitter and that of the other media. Interest stems
from the fact that, given the impossibility of analysing
agendas that are privately shared by ordinary users—
through platforms like Whatsapp or Telegram or in the
networks of relations within Facebook, for example—
analysis of the Twitter agenda assumes particular impor-
tance. Side by side with the traditional actors like politi-
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cians and journalists, Twitter also accommodates com-
mon users, activists/supporters of the various parties, or-
ganized groups, and so on. From this point of view, it of-
fers an excellent vantage point fromwhich to observe the
convergence/divergence of the public agenda. Research
carried out to date has revealed (albeit with different em-
phases and in different contexts) that the general ten-
dency is towards convergence. In the context of the US
presidential campaign, Stier, Bleier, Lietz, and Strohmaier
(2018) reached the conclusion that the public agenda is
still rather integrated, while Kang, Franklin Fowler, Franz,
and Ridout (2018, p. 42) detect a “consistency in is-
sue agendas between TV ads and tweets.” In a differ-
ent context from the election campaign, namely one
of social mobilization during a debate about civil rights
in California, Benkler, Roberts, Faris, Solow-Niederman,
and Etling (2015, p. 594) identify and describe the ex-
istence of a “networked public sphere” which emerged
as an alternative to the traditional media, yet remained
interactive with them. Vargo and Guo (2017, p. 1047)
place emphasis squarely on complementary interaction
between agendas in concluding their research into the
agenda of legacy media, news agencies, traditional me-
dia websites, online partisan media, and online non-
partisan media, when they state: “We found the net-
work agendas of various media outlets to be highly inter-
dependent, symbiotically networked and homogeneous.
Media choices have increased dramatically during the
past few years. Yet, the agenda of various media outlets
were similar.”
This traversal of the main lines of research into the
existence or otherwise of a public agenda, following the
advent of a high-choice media environment, presents a
scenario which contains interesting pointers as to the
direction to take in rethinking the very idea of a public
agenda today. However fragmented, disrupted, and dis-
connected it appears, a public agenda is nonetheless still
present in relation to the various media outlets.
Significant too is the presence of a cross-media in-
formation diet, bearing in mind that only a limited num-
ber of individuals admits to a monomedia diet (Dubois &
Blank, 2018). The data on individualmultimedia diets call
for a more comprehensive reading of the public agenda
itself than those undertaken in the past. This ought to
start by recognising that individuals—though able to se-
lect their own contents—have the chance to come into
contact with different public agendas. This means that
the denial tout court of a shared public agenda must be
revised, bearing in mind that the individual continues
to consume a composite media diet. It is moreover nec-
essary to take into account the interrelations between
the various agendas—which do not necessarily tend to-
wards divergence.
It is a question, therefore, of abandoning a simplistic,
reductive approach based on artificial distinctions, and
adopting one which recognizes numerous and alterna-
tive ways of reading the public agenda. These include
both individual and aggregative perspectives, which
emerge through the relations between various platforms
and which, in a nutshell, constitute the present-day
expression of information convergence in contempo-
rary society.
4. The Constituent Dimensions of the Interrelated
Public Agenda
To recognize that it is still possible to talk about a public
agenda in the current media ecosystem implies observ-
ing it as an ‘interrelated public agenda,’ the result of con-
vergent and divergent mechanisms concerning the com-
plex of legacymedia, of online information environments
(both those closely connected to the offline organs of
information and native online news sites) and of social
media, in which niche audiences contribute—thanks to
their communicative activism—to give visibility to spe-
cific issues.
With this in mind, we propose three dimensions in
order to describe public agenda interrelations: horizon-
tality vs verticality, the personal vs the aggregative, and
the dynamic vs the static. They represent three axes
which, in our view, are useful in getting one’s bear-
ings among the various mechanisms that generate the
agenda. At the same time, the axes: (a) highlight the joint
presence of different and problematic elements, commu-
nication, and power pressures which ultimately create
feedback loops, which make readings of the agenda it-
self increasingly complex; and (b) generate a continuum
within which one has to move, adopting the perspective
provided by a cross and multi-platform approach and
taking into account communication flows and develop-
ments over time.
4.1. Horizontality vs Verticality
Starting with an analysis of the horizontality vs vertical-
ity dimension entails the immediate introduction of ref-
erences to the intrinsic nature of the new media system,
more and more characterised in terms of relations be-
tween environments and less and less able to “converge
in the authoritative power to set the ‘public agenda”’
(Bennett & Pfetsch, 2018, p. 249). This new order super-
sedes not only a public agenda that is built thanks to the
exercise of ‘authoritative power,’ but also a power struc-
ture which is no longer reproducible in present-day soci-
eties.What in the pastwas the fruit of a balance of power
between members of the political and media elites is to-
day the fruit of direct or indirect interaction with other
subjects. Thus, not only the range of voices to be heard
in the public sphere has increased (Coleman, 2017), but
also the number of those who can build that sphere.
To acknowledge the increase in the number of ac-
tors taking part in public agenda building obviously does
not mean according all the actors equal roles: A privi-
leged relation in power dealings between political elites
and media elites is still clearly discernible, just as Reese
(1991) noted years ago. At the same time, however, this
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can come under threat from the behaviour of individ-
ual subjects—such as online users—who can publicly ex-
press opinions and take positions with sufficient force to
impact on the existing balance. This can happen through
a sort of spontaneous, widespread mobilization or by or-
ganising collective action such as sharing and retweet-
ing specific contents. The centrality conceded to social
media by journalists and politicians alike amounts to a
sort of precondition which holds them in constant ten-
sion, in search of expressions of support or possible op-
position. Citizens and organised groups are therefore
in a position—which does not always materialize but
nonetheless exists—to directly influence the building of
the public agenda.
Interaction between multiple communication plat-
forms similarly revises existing power relations. Whether
it is a question of social media, online news only, or sites
of a different kind (the Breitbart site, for example), it is
clear that power relations are being redefined. In this re-
spect, the central role still accorded traditional media in
deciding the public agenda (Djerf-Pierre& Shehata, 2017)
does not fully account for the complexity of the question.
In fact, there are more and more cases in which it is the
social media and online news sites that are really instru-
mental in developing a piece of news (Chadwick, 2013).
The proliferation of information platforms and the pos-
sibility of sharing content through social media makes it
impossible today to preserve a power balance, as in times
gone by. The verticality of relations, between actors but
also platforms and online news sites, belongs to the past,
and the power which was once invested in certain media
now serves to reinforce and legitimize what is broadcast
by other subjects (Harder, Sevenans, & van Aelst, 2017),
in a perspective which is horizontal and interrelated.
In this sense, this dimension of the interrelated me-
dia agenda underlines the need to put issues relating to
the intermediate agenda (as described in Section 2) at
the centre of the analysis, in order to explore how new
forms of salience of issues are produced, taking into ac-
count the temporal propagation between different me-
dia agendas and the creation of specific correspondences
between agendas.
4.2. Personal vs Aggregative
The personal vs aggregative dimension is an analytical di-
mension which enables us to connect the numerous dis-
cussions and agendas produced both online and offline,
ranging from those more oriented towards a personal di-
mension to those shared by a community of interests or
by a community in its entirety. In this way, the synthesis
at the root of agenda melding—i.e., “the social process
by which we meld agendas from various sources, includ-
ing other people, to create pictures of the world that fit
out experiences and preferences” (McCombs et al., 2014,
p. 794)—can be extended and also applied to the pub-
lic agenda, as it is traditionally understood. This dimen-
sion is affected by the tension generated in the current
media context between media spaces oriented towards
personalization and the contexts, including technological
ones which facilitate aggregation. We have mentioned
how a high-choice media environment like the present
one has acted—also from the viewpoint of the editorial
strategies of both legacy media and online platforms—
so as to orientate the individual among the plethora of
choices through the dynamics of personalization. This is
particularly true for the digital exploitation of content,
of both traditional and native media, which is regulated
by algorithms which treat search behaviour and exploita-
tion as data with which to nourish themselves. Previous
choices become the premises for future choices, and this
occurs in a context of connected social relations where
even the choices of another user within the same me-
dia environment conditions the situation that the first
user encounters.
At the same time, aggregation practices are typical of
the digital environment—as in the example of hashtags
which blend individual contents into a collective visibil-
ity stream. By means of its Trending Topics, Twitter, for
example, highlights what the system considers up-and-
coming topics, according to a kind of attention ranking
which is reminiscent of a media agenda without actu-
ally being one. This logic of visibility with a view to being
taken up by the mass media system is at the root, for ex-
ample, of many hashtag activism ventures (Segerberg &
Bennett, 2011).
4.3. Dynamic vs Static
Finally, the dynamic vs static variable refers us to that
fluid area which surrounds the relations between actors,
between media platforms, and between the personal
agenda and the public. It seems clear, in fact, that it is
no longer possible to delimit rigidly the spaces of action
and of relation, and that everything is placed in a rela-
tional context which changes extremely rapidly. This be-
ing so, it is important to orient research towards the re-
lation between media spaces (and agendas) rather than
concentrating on single-platform visions. To analyse the
Twitter agenda—for example, specific themes dealt with
in an aggregatedmanner bymeans of a hashtag—means
taking account of thematic and discursive relations with
other media or considering how other media are intro-
duced to Twitter through sharing, and how these interre-
lations create an agenda which emerges from what hap-
pens on Twitter.
Furthermore, this axis indicates how the processual
dimension becomes central in analysing the production
of the interrelated media agenda, highlighting, for ex-
ample, how, in a period marked by websites and online
news constantly producing and disseminating informa-
tion, the interval inwhich themedia influence each other
reciprocally is very variable, and while some issues are
broadcast instantly others hover for longer on the out-
skirts of the media agenda and come to the fore later on
(Conway et al., 2017).
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5. The Interrelated Public Agenda and the “Unity of
Difference” of Public Spheres
The dimensions of the ‘interrelated public agenda’ need
to be seen in relation to the challenges to our conceptu-
alisation of the public sphere in a multiplicity of public
spheres (Rossi & Boccia Artieri, 2014). This multiplicity,
however, needs to be seen in unity, beginning with the
various spheres’ decisive role from a political perspec-
tive, since “empirically, isolated ‘public spheres’ in time
and space are highly unlikely phenomena due to the con-
stantly circulating, flowing and leaking nature of commu-
nication” (Rasmussen, 2016, p. 80).
In this sense, public political discourse can be consid-
ered a uniform reality which, however, emerges in an
increasingly differentiated manner in the context of a
process of mediatization (Strömbäck & Dimitrova, 2011)
which features the joint presence of different media en-
vironments, online and offline, therefore involving differ-
entiated publics as well as specific groups and subject
matters. This position is not at odds with the conviction
that we need to go beyond Habermas’ model of the pub-
lic sphere, nor does it clash with the idea of a more com-
plex, dynamic, and multifaceted model which highlights
the connections and overlappings of a multitude of co-
existing public spheres.
Rather, rethinking the public agenda as interrelated
requires the researcher to undertake observations that
connect and differentiate at the same time: In other
words, to observe a “unity of difference” (Luhmann,
1997) of the public sphere, it is a question of rethink-
ing this “unity in difference” of the public sphere, not so
much in relation to the idea that every media platform—
whether legacy media or social media—generates its
own public sphere as to the possibility to observe ‘a’ pub-
lic agenda through the convergences and divergences of
the various media agendas, taking convergence and di-
vergence as two aspects of a single form, that of an ‘in-
terrelated public agenda.’
Rather than pursue an abstract, decontextualised
idea of a cohesive, one-dimensional public agenda, it
makes more sense to recognise the fact that today’s
public agenda is the product of convergences and di-
vergences between media agendas. These can be analy-
sed (see Figure 1) using the three dimensions we have
just outlined in relation to emerging levels of the public
sphere which tend towards ever more abstract forms of
aggregations (Bruns & Highfield, 2016).
These specific public spheres—technological (e.g.,
blogosphere, Twittersphere) or belonging to specific
areas (like the political domain)—represent specific
areas—even overlapping ones—within the more gen-
eral Habermasian public sphere. Therefore, these pub-
lic spheres do not move away from the idea that there
is a current and constant public debate that concerns
large audiences, audiences who are interested in a spe-
cific topic or deal with it within a specific media context
(the blogger is a case in point).
We then find the production of “public sphericules”
(Cunningham, 2001), which are formed by the aggre-
gation of individuals around specific themes (e.g., hu-
man rights) and can also assume the form of counter-
publics (in terms of agenda divergence). These “spher-
icules” carve out specific issues from more general do-
mains and concern specific interest groups and narrower
publics, not necessarily reflecting, nor empirically repre-
senting, the discourse of society. These are kinds of “ver-
nacular voices” indicating the rise of a public that gen-
erates a discursive arena, an open exchange in a public
sphere which has the ability to generate a sense of pub-
horizontality
ve
r
ca
lit
y
personal
aggregave
dynamic
stac
Domain-based public spheres
Public sphericules
Issue publics
Patchwork of
networked publics
Figure 1. Dimensions of ‘interrelated public agendas’ and public spheres. Source: Authors composition.
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lic opinion (Hauser, 1999). These “voices” are outside of
generative power, and this public discourse acts as fine
tuning with respect to public opinion as an element of
continuous tension in discursive production.
From a more general angle and from the viewpoint
of globalization, “they provide a central site for pub-
lic communication in globally dispersed communities,
stage communal difference and discord productively,
and work to articulate insider ethnospecific identities”
(Cunningham, 2001, p. 135). If we consider “public spher-
icules” in the context which we have described, marked
by the fragmentation of the public sphere and an infor-
mation environment which complexifies the possibility
of producing, distributing, and consuming information,
we can observe how aggregation gives rise to a:
Communal process of gatewatching in which blog-
gers and citizen journalists identify and link to or di-
rectly cite relevant materials as they become avail-
able. Through such processes, content is reappropri-
ated and reinserted into the public debate beyond the
conventional spaces of the virtual, mass media stage.
(Bruns, 2008, p. 68)
At a less abstract level, we find aggregations which
emerge day by day around a specific issue and which
nowadays find a way (especially on the web and
via social network sites) of ensuring visibility—and
researchability—for a debate which often peters out in
a matter of days and involves a multitude of actors, in-
stitutional and otherwise, pressure groups, journalists,
etc. In this sense, Habermas (2006) speaks of the emer-
gence of “issue publics” as hubs around which the inter-
est and conversation of a political public is focused. The
unpredictability and variable success of the different is-
sues “are influenced by everyday talk in the informal set-
tings or episodic publics of civil society at least as much
as they are by paying attention to print or electronic me-
dia” (Habermas, 2006, p. 416). In political communica-
tion, the practice of highlighting a specific issue bymeans
of a hashtag is symptomatic of this desire to aggregate
social media users and give them visibility as citizens
holding a particular point of view. And this holds good
whether it is played according to the verticality logic—
e.g., by politicians imposing a specific hashtag in sup-
port of its position—or the horizontality logic, as in the
case of hashtag activism when active citizens aim to ag-
gregate other citizens. It needs stressing that individuals
contribute to a variety of issues, to the extent that “the
overlap of issue publicsmay even serve to counter trends
of fragmentation” (Habermas, 2006, p. 422), suggesting
that, in traversing the different issues, rather than the ef-
fect of separate echo chambers, one ends up by making
them porous and interrelated by the discourses which
converge and diverge in relation to themes which are be-
coming prominent.
A further level of aggregation are the networked
publics (boyd, 2010), in which personal and public is-
sues tend to converge and overlap, especially in struc-
turing social networks which mix offline and online and
find their most advanced expression in social network
sites. In these media spaces, the multitude, the crowd,
is transformed into a public, following the principle that
every user, at one and the same time, is someone’s pub-
lic and has his or her own public. Agenda building here
is a matter of alternating moments of production and
consumption, of using private contents—narration, im-
ages, videos—to aggregate with public themes, and pub-
lic contents—newspaper articles, photojournalism, news
videos—to emphasise personal preferences and tastes
(Boccia Artieri & Gemini, 2019). For networked publics,
the combination of posts, sharings, tweets, retweets, sto-
ries on Instagram, etc., and the thousands of comments,
taggings, and reactions which contribute—through the
algorithms—to give visibility to specific contents, merges
with contents produced by the legacy media (and which
often re-emerge in online spaces) and with face to face
conversations, sometimes triggered by those online and
sometimes interwoven with those online, since part of
the public of every ego-network is made up of people
with whom one associates, in various ways, in everyday
life. This patchwork of networked publics therefore con-
stitutes the less abstract level—even if supra-individual—
where public sphere themes and the various personal
media agendas are part of the connecting tissue.
All this produces a need to focus on a complex con-
text of ‘interrelated public agendas’ held in tension by
horizontal and vertical forces, personal and aggregative
orientations, and static and dynamic conditions, within a
circular intermedia flowwhichmoves between themore
traditionally understood public sphere environment, rep-
resented by the general media, and the environment of
thematic “public sphericules,” and from here to the dis-
cussion of emerging “issue publics”—also in the wake
of those built around online hashtags or communities of
interest—before taking account of networked publics in
which personal and collective thematic levels are seam-
lessly interrelated (Figure 1).
The connection flow which stems from this is made
up of public themes, of editorial interests vis-à-vis typolo-
gies and niche publics, and of forms of direct engage-
ment by the online publics themselves who, in searching
for, commenting on, and sharing content and reacting
publicly to it, build visible relations between the differ-
ent agendas and produce retroactive effects at an edito-
rial level.
6. Conclusions
This article has analysed the way in which contempo-
rary political communication is conditioned by an infor-
mation environment characterised, on the one hand, by
increased choice, and on the other by the fragmenta-
tion and multiplication of the ways of consuming infor-
mation. It has also dwelt on the way the consequences
of this change have led to the current public sphere be-
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ing described in the literature as chaotic, fragmented,
and disrupted. But this does not mean that today’s ‘dis-
sonant’ public sphere necessarily entails either the dis-
appearance of the public agenda or a divergent, frag-
mentary, and multiple public agenda. More in general,
as has been shown, studies on the intermedia agenda
have highlighted how, in the current high choice media
environment, there are strong connections as regards po-
litical communication between the legacy media agen-
das and the social media, and that forms of convergence
(more frequent) and divergence (produced in any case
by the interrelation of agendas) represent two aspects
of the same coin.
In our opinion, the observation of an ‘interrelated
public agenda’ requires us to take account of elements
of convergence and divergence from a single viewpoint,
adopting a complex analysismodelwhich proceeds along
axes that make a continuum visible, in which opposing
forces are in a constant, problematic equilibrium. In this
sense, we identified three dimensions which are helpful
in describing public agenda interrelations.
First, the horizontality vs verticality dimension, con-
taining the dynamics of power, generated in a context
of political disintermediation through the altered na-
ture of the media system—in the complex relation be-
tween legacy media and web 2.0, and between social,
institutional actors, and others. Second, the personal vs
aggregative dimension, which stresses the need to take
account of convergences and divergences between per-
sonal orientation towards certain issues and the aggrega-
tive pressure in different media spaces in which peo-
ple feel at home: from information consumption via me-
dia diets of varying complexity to active participation in
the production of content or in public discourse, offline
and online. And, finally, the dynamic vs static dimension,
which points to the need to orient analysis towards the
relationship between media spaces rather than focusing
on specific spaces, thus helping, importantly, to make up
for the current dearth of research in comparison with
studies of single platforms. This relational perspective in-
dicates that analysis of agendas and media spaces needs
to be angled in terms of re-fero (reference to other agen-
das/media spaces), of re-ligo (in connection with other
agendas/media spaces), and of the emerging context of
the interrelated agenda in comparison with single, spe-
cific, aggregate agendas.
The three dimensions proposed: (a) make use of op-
posing poles as elements to account for the communica-
tion and power tensions in producing the agenda; and, at
the same time, (b) point to the need to take into consider-
ation a continuum between the poles in order to explain
a state of flux.
These dimensions, typical of the ‘interrelated public
agenda,’ can be read in relation to a public sphere model
which takes into account fragmentation and disruptive el-
ements,moving froma stratificationwhich highlights the
processes at work: This begins with more abstract levels,
where we define public spheres in a segmentary man-
ner; it then moves on to thematic “public sphericules”
and “issue publics,” down to the patchwork of networked
publics in which personal and media agendas overlap
and interweave.
To adopt this viewpoint therefore involves entertain-
ing the possibility of dealing with the unity of agenda
difference by means of a relational and flow-based ap-
proach, which makes it possible to bring out the dynam-
ics of divergence and convergence and account for the
evolution of the agenda over time. If the concept of
agenda melding can be helpful in explaining, at an in-
dividual level, the effect/impression of harmony among
the various agendas examined, at a systemic level this
can be better accounted for by the concept suggested
of an ‘interrelated public agenda’—i.e., the outcome
of the interaction of numerous reading levels. This in-
cludes the individual as well as the aggregate dimen-
sion, and takes shape thanks to the contribution of sev-
eral platforms, as well as the numerous and varied log-
ics which govern them. In this sense, the ‘interrelated
public agenda’ is none other than the product of the
contributions of numerous actors involved in various
ways in the process of public agenda building, in continu-
ous, unavoidable interaction determined by the specifici-
ties/peculiarities of the various communicative environ-
ments and by the interaction, direct or indirect, of the
actors involved. The different public sphere agendas are
thus treated as differentiations that operate along the
same horizon, highlighting how the differences function
within the same context.
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